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Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition, by Nicholas
Rescher. Marquette University Press, 2005. Pp. 270. $20 (cloth).
TED POSTON, University of South Alabama
Nicholas Rescher continues his prodigious output with this book, a prod
uct of his 2005 Aquinas Lecture. Rescher's aim is to consider the proper
place of common sense in philosophy. He accomplishes this with a wide
ranging survey of issues common sense may bear on. Rescher's overall
conclusion is that common sense has an important bearing on philosophi
cal doctrine and method.
In the first chapter, "Common-Sense Knowledge and its Nature," Rescher presents his view of the nature of common sense. He distinguishes
between common-sense principles and common-sense judgments. Com
mon sense judgments need to be grounded in a general common sense
principle (p. 38). A common-sense principle is a general rule governing
the determination of common-sense truths (p. 36). The common-sense
principle is likewise a matter of common sense. The key feature of these
principles is that they reflect "the general experience of mankind in meet
ing human needs" (p. 38). Rescher views common sense as inherently
pragmatic. He writes that the aim of common sense is "to achieve a ratio
nally grounded commonality (uniformity) of opinion and evaluation in a
commonalty of agents dependent on cooperative and collaborative action
in meeting human needs" (p. 42).
In chapter two, "The Rationale of Common-Sense Knowledge," Rescher explains that the domain of common sense facts is limited to our
pre-theoretical view of the world and our place in it (p. 52). This point
follows naturally from his pragmatic conception of common sense. The
authority of common sense lies in the fact that common sense is a useful
guide to life and has proven a useful guide to life for many other individu
als both in the past and in the present (p. 63). Rescher here advocates a
view similar to critical commonsensism (p. 59). He avers that the claims
of common sense are not irrefragable certainties. They are powerful pre
sumptions that should be abandoned only in "very unusual conditions"
(p. 57). He closes the chapter with passing responses to objections to com
mon sense (pp. 64-9). One of the objections he doesn't consider here is that
common sense is inconsistent. He briefly considers this earlier, alluding to
an article by Peter Unger on common sense. Interestingly, Rescher doesn't
dispute that common sense is inconsistent. He instead observes that in
consistency afflicts rational inquires in general and thus concludes that
"common sense is at no disadvantage vis-a-vis the products of rational
inquiry in general" (p. 55). Perhaps Rescher's point is that the mere pres
ence of inconsistency isn't a sufficient reason for the wholesale rejection of
common sense.
In the third chapter, "Certainty and Skepticism in the Light of Common
Sense," Rescher addresses the skeptical argument that since we cannot be
certain that skeptical possibilities fail to obtain we cannot know matters
of common sense. Rescher agrees with an assumption of this argument
that knowledge implies certainty (p. 72). He explains, though, that cer
tainty can be understood in two senses: certainty beyond any reasonable
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doubt and certainty beyond any possible doubt (p. 76). It is not clear from
Rescher's exposition whether he thinks that 'certainty' is contextual or
whether there are two different concepts of certainty. His response to the
skeptical argument goes through more smoothly if he takes the contextualist route. On this route, skeptical possibilities do not get a grip. I can
know there is a chair in the room because I am certain that plausible fal
sifying circumstances don't obtain. I just walked over to the chair and
sat down. After this response to the skeptic, Rescher appears to switch
gears to consider another response to skepticism appealing to economic
rationality. He reasons that we are economically rational in proceeding on
the assumption that skeptical possibilities don't obtain (pp. 83-87). The
appeal to economic rationality here is puzzling. If it's certain that skepti
cal possibilities do not obtain then we needn't justify common sense by
appealing to cost-effective concerns. The appeal to economic rationality
treats the skeptical possibilities as live options whereas common sense
completely dismisses skeptical scenarios.
In chapter four, "Common Sense, Trust, and Communication," Rescher
provides an economic rationale for our trust in common sense and for the
presumptions involved in communication. The overarching theme is that
cost-benefit considerations and not factual considerations underwrite our
basic trust in our senses and other people (pp. 98, 126). This chapter ex
hibits a similar oddity with the last several pages of the previous chapter.
The oddity is that Rescher's economic defense of common sense is unnec
essary given his earlier response to skepticism. Once skeptical worries are
adequately addressed we needn't belabor the point that common sense is
largely accurate. Yet there is a deeper peculiarity with the chapter that lies
in Rescher's claims that factual considerations don't underwrite our trust
in common sense (pp. 98, 126). It's peculiar because factual considerations
do underwrite this trust. That I receive a good report from the ophthal
mologist underwrites my trust in relying on eyesight.
The fifth chapter, "Science and Common Sense" argues that common
sense and the deliverances of science are not incompatible. Rescher stress
es that common sense is distinct from common belief. The widespread
belief in the pre-Copernican era that the Sun rotated around the Earth is
merely a common belief; it is not "ground[ed] in a general principle that
reflects the general experience of mankind in meeting human needs" (p.
38). Rescher then reasons that common sense is inexact (pp. 140ff.). The
correctness of common sense lies in its indefiniteness (p. 141). As I un
derstood it, the inexactness and indefiniteness of common-sense claims is
that they have little content. The actual content of common-sense claims is
weak enough so as to be compatible with most—if not all-developm ents
in science and every serious philosophical position.
In the sixth chapter, "Universality and Common Sense in Moral Mat
ters," Rescher argues that fundamental moral considerations—respect
persons, don't inflict needless harm, etc.—are common sense. Moreover, he
argues that these principles are inherent in moral concepts (p. 173). The
person who abandons such principles is not engaged in the moral enter
prise for conceptual reasons (p. 173). It is not clear what the argument is
for this claim. Furthermore, it is unclear why we need this conceptual de
fense of morality. Rescher begins the chapter with the challenge of moral
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relativism. It is sufficient to respond to that challenge by noting that the
alleged claims made by relativists do not actually support relativism (a
strategy Rescher employs throughout the chapter). Thus moral relativism
does not conflict with common sense.
In the final chapter, "Common Sense in Philosophy," Rescher evalu
ates the role common sense plays in philosophical deliberation. The up
shot of this chapter is that common sense provides a weak constraint on
philosophical deliberation, ruling out neither Berkeleyan idealism nor
Humean skepticism. Furthermore, Rescher doesn't endorse Moore's use
of common sense to rule out non-trivial philosophical positions. In this
context Rescher's insistence that common sense "plays a significant role in
philosophical deliberations" appears exaggerated (p. 234). The constraint
common sense provides is merely that language must be used conform
ably with usage and that departures from common sense are justifiable
only when only when there are very good reasons to do so (p. 209).
The most interesting aspect of this study on common sense is Rescher's
appeal to economic considerations to justify common sense. This strategy
seems right insofar as one is concerned with utility maximization. Yet the
epistemic issue remains. What epistemic rationale is there for thinking that
matters of common sense tend to be correct? It is not clear how Rescher's
economic justification of common sense bears on this question. Moreover,
the issue of epistemic reasons apropos common sense can be raised for the
utility assignments Rescher uses to provide the economic defense. Given
such and such utility assignments it's economically rational to depend on
the deliverances of common sense. Yet, one may wonder, what are the
epistemic reasons for thinking that those are the right utility assignments?
Rescher does not tell us. Nevertheless, Rescher's economic approach is
appealing and it deserves a good run for its money.

